Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

30 August 1983

LEBANON: Responsibility for Current Fighting

Summary

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Available evidence points to the Druze as having been most heavily involved in the shelling in Beirut over the patwo days. The Shia were also involved, although apparently to a lesser extent. The 82-mm mortar rounds that killed the US Marines could have come from a range of no more than two miles, indicating that one of the Lebanese groups, rather than the Syrians, was responsible for that attack.	
The Syrians have routinely provided	25X1
logistical support, and weapons to both the Druze and the Shia, but we lack confirmed evidence on the extent of direct Syrian involvement in the current fighting. We believe the Syrians at a minimum have been indirectly involved in the shelling over the past two days, and we know Syrian units have shelled Lebanese Government positions elsewhere in Lebanon.	
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29 August 1983 Marines responded to shelling of their positions with 155-mm artillery, "silencing a Druze position."	25X1 25X1
2.0 August 1002	
29 August 1983 In a phone conversation with Ambassador Dillon on Monda	٧.
Shia Amal leader Nabih Barri denied that the Shia attacked the Marines. He said the shells came from the	, ,
mountains.	25 X ′
	25X ²
30 August 1983 the rounds that killed two	25 X ′
Marines were fired from 82-mm mortars.	25X ⁻
	25 X

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25X1

Syrian Warnings

Damascus has issued several warnings that Syria will actively oppose a decision by President Gemayel to send the Lebanese Army into the Shuf.

- -- The Syrian Government newspaper Tishrin warned in an editorial last Saturday that Damascus would "confront and deter" any move by the Army into the Shuf.
- -- In an earlier editorial, Tishrin commented that Gemayel's insistence on sending the LAF into the Shuf without achieving political reconciliation would ensure a civil war. It concluded with a clear warning: "We would like to draw Gemayel's attention to the fact that Syria is concerned directly with this matter in the event he still insists on carrying out his threat . . . Gemayel and the others certainly know what this means."

Although Syrian editorials consistently take more extreme positions than official statements, we believe the editorials clearly signal President Assad's continuing inflexibility and opposition to Lebanese Army deployment into the Shuf.

Syrian Political Position Hardening

Ambassador Paganelli reported from Damascus this morning that Druze leader Walid Junblatt found Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam and Chief of Staff Shihabi uncompromising in his meetings with them following the talks in Paris. Junblatt told the Ambassador that the basic issue remains the Israeli-Lebanese Agreement on troop withdrawal. The Syrians would not accept an announcement that the instruments of ratification would not be exchanged. Junblatt said he had been unable to find a formula acceptable to Damascus.

Junblatt did not meet with President Assad, but we believe the President is likely to remain equally uncompromising. With Prime Minister Begin's announcement of his intention to resign and President Gemayel clearly on the defensive, Assad almost certainly sees an opportunity to push for abrogation of the agreement and to force Gemayel into a political accommodation with Syria's allies in Lebanon. Assad will probably continue to argue that the only solution is to achieve a "comprehensive national reconciliation."

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Soviet Reaction to Increased US Presence in Lebanon

The Soviets will attempt, likewise, to get propaganda mileage out of any US effort to expand the MNF.

If US forces return fire to Syrian-controlled territory in Lebanon, Damascus might seek some clear signs of support from Moscow. In addition to a propaganda blitz, and an increase in naval presence, the Soviets might:

- -- present a demarche to Washington and make it public to show the USSR as standing up for the Arabs against US "aggression."
- -- attempt to raise the issue at the UN.
- -- dispatch a high-level military and/or political official to Damascus.
- -- hold a combined military exercise with the Syrians, although this probably could not be pulled together quickly enough to have an effect on the crisis.

In this latter scenario, Moscow may also encourage the Syrians and their Lebanese allies to increase attacks against US forces.